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Introduction
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has been described as “the most important regulatory agency
in the world.”1 It has proven remarkably capable at protecting the American public from unsafe drug
products, but when it came to promoting competition in the pharmaceutical industry, encouraging the
widespread dissemination of aﬀordable versions of safe and eﬀective drug products, it was constrained by
external laws and internal procedures, and its resources were limited. The Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act,2 also known as the Hatch-Waxman Act, was passed by Congress in 1984
to accomplish this laudable goal, establishing a delicate balance between the competing interests of brand
name drug companies and generic drug companies,3 with the public as the ultimate beneﬁciary, reaping the
reward of an aﬀordable and diverse drug supply. To promote innovation by pharmaceutical companies, the
Act was supposed to partially extend the brand name drug manufacturers’ patent monopoly through the
period lost to the FDA approval process. To promote early and eﬃcient access to generic drugs, the Act was
supposed to allow generic drug companies to partially circumvent patent restrictions and accelerate FDA
approval so that they would be able to bring their products to market as soon as the brand name drug
companies’ patents expired or were found invalid or not infringed. Somewhere along the line, however, these
purposes were derailed. Certain loopholes within the Act, unfortunately, create perverse incentives for brand
1Philip J. Hilts, Protecting America’s Health: The FDA, Business, and One Hundred Years of Regulation xiv
(Random House 2003).
2Pub. L. No. 98-417.
3For the purposes of this paper, brand name drug companies refers to companies that have FDA approval to market drugs
that have not received approval previously, and hold patents on these drugs, usually pioneering drug companies with signiﬁcant
research and development or corporate acquisition programs. Generic drug companies refers to companies that have or are
seeking FDA approval to market generic versions of drugs that have received approval previously, and typically do not hold
patents on these drugs.
1name and generic drug companies to enter into collusive agreements, with possible antitrust implications,
to the detriment of the public. Recent legislative reform eﬀorts have focused on closing these loopholes,
but have not given signiﬁcant consideration to the broader implications of the Act. The equilibrium point
established in 1984 has shifted signiﬁcantly, with the recent introduction into the ﬁeld of a new player in the
drug development process, the research tools industry. Research tool, brand name drug and generic drug
developers each occupy a particular niche in the system, but due to the interpretation of certain Hatch-
Waxman provisions, their roles in the statutory framework that governs the system have been conﬂated in
a manner that was probably not anticipated by the drafters of the Act, artiﬁcially pitting them against one
another in the legal arena, while they operate synergistically in the industrial arena.
In Chapter I, this paper will navigate through the maze of the Hatch-Waxman Act’s statutory amendments,
describing the Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) and the Patent Term Extension procedures
created by the Act, the functions that Congress probably intended these features of the Act to serve, and
how successful the Act has been at meeting these goals.
In Chapter II, this paper will focus on those provisions of the Act that have had the unintended consequence
of prolonging brand name drug companies’ market exclusivity, and incentivizing collusion between brand
name and generic drug companies, to the detriment of the public. Special emphasis will be placed on
Congress’ attempts at legislative reforms that involve either closing these loopholes or increasing the Federal
Trade Commission’s (FTC) and Justice Department’s enforcement power, in response to recent criticisms
by the FTC.
In Chapter III, this paper will follow the gradual expansion in scope of the Bolar amendment,4 one of the
435 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), so named because it eﬀectively overruled Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., 733
F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984), in which the Federal Circuit held that the manufacture, use, or sale of a patented invention during
the term of the patent constituted an act of infringement, even if it was for the sole purpose of conducting tests and developing
information necessary to apply for regulatory approval.
2provisions of the Act, through progressive iterations in judicial precedent, as it evolved from its originally
intended role, as a balancing factor between the interests of brand name and generic drug companies, to its
current role, as a potential threat to the legitimacy of the research tools industry. Other threats that certain
patent law doctrines pose to this ﬂedgling industry will also be discussed, and possible solutions, reform
eﬀorts to preserve the integrity of this industry, will also be suggested.
3Chapter I: Navigating the Hatch-Waxman Act
As it stood prior to 1984, the term of a patent for a drug, or a process for manufacturing a drug, or a
therapeutic use for a drug, was subject to two distortions.5 The ﬁrst distortion took place at the beginning
of the patent term, a result of the FDA approval process. With most patented inventions, one could bring a
product to market immediately after the patent issued, or even earlier. However, for new drug products, one
had to obtain permission from the FDA before going to market, which necessitated conducting the requisite
clinical trials, submitting the requisite data, and waiting for the requisite regulatory review period. This
implied a long period of time when the patented product was awaiting entry into the market, when the
patentees, or assignees thereof, were unable to proﬁt from their invention’s market exclusivity, a period of
time that ate into the patent term, limiting the economic advantage the patentees could derive from their
temporary monopoly.
The other distortion occurred at the end of the patent term. Normally when a patent on an invention expires,
the monopoly ends, allowing competitors to immediately enter the market, to oﬀer consumers alternative
products, to dramatically bring down the price. This did not occur in the drug industry. Before generic drug
companies could oﬀer competing drug products to consumers, they had to subject these products to intense
FDA scrutiny. Because they could not manufacture and conduct studies on competing products during the
term of the patent without infringing,6 they had to wait until the patent expired before they could initiate
the FDA regulatory review procedure. This meant that even after the drug patents had expired, there was
a period of time when competing products, trapped in FDA review, could not enter the market, artiﬁcially
extending the period of exclusivity conferred by the patent.
5Eli Lilly v. Medtronic, 496 U.S. 661, 669 (1990).
6Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
4One might wonder what the problem was. The two distortions of patent term seemed to cancel each other
out, with the brand name drug companies recovering the period of exclusivity they lost in the FDA review
process in the form of a period of exclusivity gained while their generic competitors were subject to review. It
was a delicately balanced, but stable, equilibrium, at least for the brand name drug companies. The problems
in the system aﬀected the development of generics. Generics provided competing products, they kept drug
prices low, made them aﬀordable and accessible. Although drug patents were useful in fostering innovation,
in allowing brand name drug companies to leverage their market exclusivity to recover their investment
in research and development, as a matter of public policy it was to society’s beneﬁt to introduce generic
versions of as many drugs as possible as quickly as possible, to maximize consumer savings. Unfortunately,
in the pre-1984 system, there was little incentive for the generics to do so. If they attempted to prematurely
research a competing product, challenging the validity of a patent, they would be subject to an infringement
suit, an expense they could ill aﬀord when the potential return on their investment was so far in the future.
And once they ﬁnally brought a product to market, price competition would have dramatically lowered
their proﬁt margins relative to those enjoyed by brand name drug companies, despite the generics’ having
undergone a signiﬁcant outlay of expenditures on expensive human clinical trials, almost comparable to the
brand name drug companies’ clinical studies and research and development expenses, before being able to
bring their product to market. Only the most truly altruistic or delusional would have been able to remain
in the industry, which is why, prior to 1984, only 36% of top-selling brand name drugs had a competing
generic product on the market,7 and generic drugs accounted for only 19% of prescription drug volume.8
7Congressional Budget Office, How Increased Competition from Generic Drugs Has Affected Prices and Re-
turns in the Pharmaceutical Industry xii (1998) [hereinafter CBO Study].
8Id. at 27.
5The Hatch-Waxman Act
In response to these perceived problems, Congress passed the Hatch-Waxman Act, in 1984. The Act con-
tained two titles. Title I, Abbreviated New Drug Applications, amended the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA), 21 U.S.C. § 355, and part of Title II, Patent Extension, amended the U.S. Patent Code, 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e), to address the distortion of patent term caused by the extension of market exclusivity due to the
delayed market entry of competing generics as a result of FDA review.9 The remainder of Title II, Patent
Extension, amended the U.S. Patent Code, 35 U.S.C. § 156, to address the distortion of patent term caused
by the loss of assertable market exclusivity time to FDA review procedure.10
Amendments to accelerate approval of generic drugs
Title I introduced a procedure for ﬁling an ANDA, an abbreviated new drug application, which would
accelerate the review process for generic versions of drugs that had previously been approved. It also gave
the FDA instructions on how to respond to ﬁlings of either ANDAs or NDAs (new drug applications, which
have additional data submission requirements relative to ANDAs) for new versions of drugs that it had
previously approved.
Under Section 101 of the Act, an ANDA can be ﬁled for a new drug11 if the applicant can show that the new
drug has the same active ingredients,12 route of administration, dosage form and strength13 as a previously
9H.R. Rep. No. 98-857(I), at 16-17 (1984).
10Id. at 17-18.
1121 U.S.C. § 355(j)(1).
12Id. at § 355(j)(2)(A)(ii)(I-II).
13Id. at § 355(j)(2)(A)(iii).
6approved14 drug, requiring only a demonstration of bioequivalence,15 thus allowing the applicant to circum-
vent the more tedious aspects of the FDA application process by “piggybacking” on its predecessor’s clinical
research. This is a very eﬃcient outcome, as obviates the need for wasteful16 and ethically questionable
research.17 The ANDA is subject to automatic approval18 within 180 days of submission19 unless it fails to
meet one of these criteria.20 In the event of a disapproval, the applicant will have thirty days to request an
expedited rehearing, which will commence within ninety days of the end of this thirty day period, before the
Secretary of Health and Human Services, who will have ninety days after the termination of the hearing to
render a decision.21 All in all, the FDA review procedure had been signiﬁcantly streamlined.
Anyone ﬁling an ANDA,22 or a NDA for a previously approved drug,23 has to make a certiﬁcation,24 that the
patent which claims the previously approved drug either: (1) has not been listed with the FDA (a paragraph
I certiﬁcation); (2) has expired (a paragraph II certiﬁcation); (3) will expire (a paragraph III certiﬁcation);
or (4) is invalid or will not be infringed by the generic drug’s manufacture, use or sale (a paragraph IV
certiﬁcation). This certiﬁcation will determine the date by which approval will be made eﬀective. For a
14Id. at § 355(j)(2)(A)(i).
15Id. at § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv). A bioequivalent drug, as deﬁned in 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(8) is one for which:
“(i) the rate and extent of absorption of the drug do not show a signiﬁcant diﬀerence from the rate and extent of absorption
of the listed drug when administered at the same molar dose of the therapeutic ingredient under similar experimental conditions
in either a single dose or multiple doses; or
“(ii) the extent of absorption of the drug does not show a signiﬁcant diﬀerence from the extent of absorption of the listed
drug when administered at the same molar dose of the therapeutic ingredient under similar experimental conditions in either
a single dose or multiple doses and the diﬀerence from the listed drug in the rate of absorption of the drug is intentional, is
reﬂected in its proposed labeling, is not essential to the attainment of eﬀective body drug concentrations on chronic use, and is
considered medically insigniﬁcant for the drug.”
16Insofar as it is duplicative and expensive.
17If a drug has already been established as the standard of care for a condition, reproducing a clinical trial that might
necessitate treating a patient subgroup with a placebo (i.e. below the standard of care) has troubling ethical implications.
1821 U.S.C. § 355(j)(4).
19Id. at § 355(j)(5)(A).
20Id. at § 355(j)(4)(A-K).
21Id. at § 355(j)(5)(C).
22Pursuant to section 101 of the Act.
23Pursuant to section 103 of the Act.
24Under either 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) for an ANDA, or 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2)(A) for a NDA on a previously approved
product.
7paragraph I or II certiﬁed application, approval will be made eﬀective immediately.25 For a paragraph III
certiﬁed application, approval will be made eﬀective upon expiration26 of the patent.27 A paragraph IV
certiﬁcation complicates things.
A paragraph IV applicant must give notice28 to each owner of the patent29 and each holder of the approved
application30 that an ANDA or NDA has been ﬁled, and include in this notice “a detailed statement of the
factual and legal basis of the applicant’s opinion that the patent is not valid or will not be infringed.”31
The patent holder then has forty-ﬁve days from receipt of this notice, during which time the possibility of a
declaratory judgment action32 with respect to the patent is suspended, to bring an action for infringement.33
If an action is not brought, approval will be made eﬀective immediately.34 However, if an infringement action
is brought, approval will be made eﬀective at the end of the thirty month period beginning with receipt of
this notice (which can be varied at the court’s discretion to reﬂect the cooperativeness of the parties)35
unless, before this period expires, the court ﬁnds the patents invalid or not infringed (in which case approval
is made eﬀective at the time of this determination),36 or valid and infringed (in which case approval is
made eﬀective at the expiration of the patent),37 or the court grants a preliminary injunction to prevent
the applicant’s commercial manufacture or sale of the drug (in which case approval is made eﬀective at the
time of this decision).38 If the thirty month period expires prior to resolution of the infringement action, the
25Id. at § 355(j)(5)(B)(i) for an ANDA; Id. at § 355(c)(3)(A) for a NDA.
26Id. at § 271(e)(4)(A).
27Id. at § 355(j)(5)(B)(ii) for an ANDA; Id. at § 355(c)(3)(B) for a NDA.
28Id. at § 355(j)(2)(B)(i) for an ANDA; Id. at § 355(b)(3)(A) for a NDA.
29Id. at § 355(j)(2)(B)(i)(I) for an ANDA; Id. at § 355(b)(3)(A)(i) for a NDA.
30Id. at § 355(j)(2)(B)(i)(II) for an ANDA; Id. at § 355(b)(3)(A)(ii) for a NDA.
31Id. at § 355(j)(2)(B)(ii) for an ANDA; Id. at § 355(b)(3)(B) for a NDA.
32Which, if brought, must be brought in the defendant’s (i.e. the patentee’s) jurisdiction. Id. at § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) for an
ANDA; Id. at § 355(c)(3)(C) for a NDA.
33Id. at § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) for an ANDA; Id. at § 355(c)(3)(C) for a NDA.
34Id. at § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) for an ANDA; Id. at § 355(c)(3)(C) for a NDA.
35Id. at § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) for an ANDA; Id. at § 355(c)(3)(C) for a NDA.
36Id. at § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I) for an ANDA; Id. at § 355(c)(3)(C)(i) for a NDA.
37Id. at § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(II) for an ANDA; Id. at § 355(c)(3)(C)(ii) for a NDA.
38Id. at § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(III) for an ANDA; Id. at § 355(c)(3)(C)(iii) for a NDA.
8generic is left with a diﬃcult choice to make, since it has been granted the ability to enter the market, but
would probably have to disgorge its proﬁts, or, even worse, compensate for the loss of the brand name drug
company’s proﬁts, should the patent ultimately be found valid and infringed.
The incentive for an ANDA ﬁler to challenge potentially weak or invalid drug patents, to brave the murky
waters of a paragraph IV certiﬁcation and an infringement action, is a 180 day period of exclusivity,39
triggered by either the ﬁrst commercial marketing of the drug40 or by a court decision holding the relevant
patent invalid or not infringed,41 awarded to the ﬁrst company to ﬁle an ANDA with a paragraph IV
certiﬁcation, during which no other ANDA approvals on the product can be made eﬀective. This strategic
provision was designed to motivate generic drug companies to challenge patents early and often, although
its potential use as a bargaining chip to leverage favorable terms in collusive agreements will be discussed
further in Chapter II.
There are, however, limits on just how early a brand name drug’s exclusivity can be challenged. An ANDA,
or a NDA for a previously approved drug, cannot be ﬁled within ﬁve years of the approval date of the ﬁrst
application for the drug, unless the new drug ANDA or NDA contains a paragraph IV certiﬁcation, in which
case it can be ﬁled within four years of the approval of its predecessor, but if the thirty month suspension of
approval is triggered by the initiation of an infringement action in the fourth year, the suspension of approval
must be extended (by up to twelve months) such that it terminates seven and a half years after the initial
approval.42
In order for the ANDA and NDA ﬁlers to know which patents to challenge, the Act introduced the Orange
39Id. at § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
40Id. at § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I).
41Id. at § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II).
42Id. at § 355(j)(5)(D)(ii) for an ANDA; Id. at § 355(c)(3)(D)(ii) for a NDA.
9Book provisions.43 NDA applicants have to disclose in their application, for eventual listing in the FDA’s
Orange Book, the patent number and expiration date of any patents that claim the drug, or its method of
use, that could be asserted against potential infringers who engage in the manufacture, use or sale of the
drug.44 If a relevant patent has not issued by the time the application is approved, the Orange Book listing
must be updated within thirty days of the issuance of said patent.45 Failure to list a relevant patent is
considered grounds for a refusal of an application,46 or withdrawal of approval.47
Of course, the careful timing of the ANDA procedures would be irrelevant if the brand name drug companies
could assert their patent rights against generics for conducting even the most preliminary research. For the
legal framework of the Act to operate, the act of infringement has to occur at a speciﬁc point in time. To this
end, Title 2 of the Act, section 202, introduced the Bolar amendment to the Patent Code as a complement
to the ANDA procedure. It insulates research activities performed in anticipation of an FDA ﬁling from an
assertion of infringement,48 an exception that cannot be curtailed by injunctive relief.49 However, the actual
ﬁling of the ANDA, or NDA for a previously approved drug, is a constructive act of infringement,50 in Justice
Scalia’s words, “a new (and somewhat artiﬁcial) act of infringement for a very limited and technical purpose
that relates only to certain drug applications,”51 to give the brand name drug companies a legal basis for
their infringement action, although it is unclear what the scope of this infringing act is in litigation. Does it
encompass those infringing activities that were conducted during the research process, or does it anticipate
those infringing acts that will occur should the product enter the market? The limitation of damages and
43Title I, section 102.
4421 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1).
45Id. at § 355(c)(2).
46Id. at § 355(d)(6).
47Id. at § 355(e)(4).
4835 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
49Id. at § 271(e)(3).
50Id. at § 271(e)(2).
51Eli Lilly v. Medtronic, 496 U.S. 661, 676 (1990).
10other monetary relief to instances where there has been commercial manufacture, use and sale of the drug52
suggests the latter. The Bolar amendment seems innocuous, but it disguises a potential for abuse that will
be discussed in further detail in Chapter III.
Amendments to recoup patent term lost to FDA review
Title II introduced a procedure for extending the term of patents on products, or methods of use or man-
ufacture thereof, that are subject to a regulatory review period before the ﬁrst53 commercial marketing or
use.54 An application for an extension of patent term can only be submitted within sixty days of receiving
regulatory approval,55 before the term of the patent has expired,56 by the owner of record.57 Such an ap-
plication can only be submitted once per patent,58 and a particular regulatory review period delay can only
be applied to one patent,59 creating a one to one patent to regulatory review period correlation that limits
to a considerable extent the potential for abuse of this provision, forcing brand name drug companies to
carefully select a patent to apply the term extension to, although the limitations of the Act are demonstrated
in situations where the FDA approves a combination therapy containing multiple independently patented
products, or when a single patent covers multiple products that require independent review periods.60
5235 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4)(c).
53Id. at § 156(a)(5)(A).
54Id. at § 156(a)(4).
55Id. at § 156(d)(1).
56Id. at § 156(a)(1).
57Id. at § 156(a)(3).
58Id. at § 156(a)(2).
59Id. at § 156(c)(4).
60See proposed amendment by Senators DeConcini and Hatch. 134 Cong. Rec. S1164 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1988) (statement
of Sen. DeConcini). The speciﬁcity of this correlation could be threatened by recently proposed legislation to reward small
biotech ﬁrms for the development of bioterrorism countermeasures with the extension of term of any patent in their portfolio.
Biological and Chemical Weapons Act, 2001 S. 1764 (2001).
11The extension of patent term is not necessarily applied across the entire breadth of the claims of the patent,
but is limited in scope to the subset of claimed subject matter that encompasses the uses or products
that have actually been approved through the regulatory review procedure applicable under the relevant
provisions of law.61
The term of the patent extension62 is equal to the sum of the period of time running from when the
application was submitted for approval to the time of approval,63 and half64 of the clinical trial period, the
period of time running from when the drug product or medical device was cleared for investigational use, or
when clinical investigation was initiated should such clearance not be required,65 to the time of submission.
However, if the applicant was found66 not to have acted with due diligence67 for any period of time during
the regulatory review process, they would be not be entitled to count that period towards the patent term
extension. In no circumstances, however, is the patent term extension to exceed ﬁve years,68 or the sum of
the original term remaining on the patent after regulatory approval and the patent term extension to exceed
fourteen years,69 and the patent term extension should be reduced accordingly to comply.70 Some critics71
claim that these changes in patent term are inconsistent with U.S. obligations under the agreement on Trade-
6135 U.S.C. § 156(b).
62Id. at § 156(c).
63Id. at § 156(g)(1-5)(B)(ii).
64Id. at § 156(c)(2).
65Id. at § 156(g)(1-5)(B)(i).
66Under 35 U.S.C. § 156(d)(2)(b), if a petition is submitted to the Secretary of Health and Human Services within 180 days
of the Secretary’s determination of the scope and duration of the patent term extension, the Secretary shall determine if the
applicant acted with due diligence over the course of the regulatory review period within ninety days of receipt of the petition,
and will publish that determination, and the factual and legal basis for it, in the Federal Register.
6735 U.S.C. § 156(c)(1). Due diligence is deﬁned in 35 U.S.C. § 156(d)(3) as “that degree of attention, continuous directed
eﬀort, and timeliness as may reasonably be expected from, and are ordinarily exercised by, a person during a regulatory review
period.”
68Id. at § 156(g)(6)(A)
69Unless, of course, the original patent term remaining after approval exceeded fourteen years, but in that case the patent
would be ineligible for extension. This situation has become more common due to the recent amendment to the patent code
that changed the expiration date of a patent from seventeen years after issuance to twenty years after ﬁling, combined with
increasing eﬃciency in the USPTO and FDA, which minimizes loss of term to regulatory review.
7035 U.S.C. § 156(c)(3).
71See generally Heidi Grygiel, Now They GATT Worry: The Impact of the GATT on the American Generic Pharmaceutical
Industry, 6 U. Balt. Intell. Prop. J. 47, (1997); Ned Milenkovich, Deleting the Bolar Amendment to the Hatch-Waxman
Act: Harmonizing Pharmaceutical Patent Protection in a Global Village, 32 J. Marshall L. Rev. 751 (1999).
12Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)72 provisions under the World Trade Organization
administered General Agreement on Tariﬀs and Trade (GATT), which mandate a twenty-year patent term,
and led to the 1995 amendment of 35 U.S.C. § 154 to increase the term of protection of a patent from
seventeen years after issuance to the period between issuance and twenty years after ﬁling, although many
would suggest that this amendment alone resolved the problem,73 which eﬀectively added on to the patent
term of all inventions subject to less than three years of USPTO scrutiny.
The extension procedure begins within sixty days of obtaining regulatory approval, with the submission of
an application containing the identity of the product,74 the patent,75 and other requisite information,76 to
the Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Oﬃce (USPTO),77 who will, within sixty days of
receipt, send a copy of the application to the Secretary of Health and Human Services,78 who will, within
thirty days of receipt, use the information in the application to determine the appropriate scope and term
of the patent extension, notify the Director of the determination, and publish it in the Federal Register, at
which point the Director shall issue a certiﬁcate of extension to append to the original patent.79
The passage of the patent extension provisions ultimately forced the brand name drug industry to make a
strategic trade-oﬀ. Under the old system, once their patents expired, they had to rely only on the probability
that potential generic competitors would be held up in FDA review for an indeterminate period of time,
through a process over which they had no inﬂuence. After the passage of the Act, once the patents’ initial
terms expired, they still retained a period of exclusivity with terms that they could calculate, and take into
72TRIPS, Art. 33.
73Although signiﬁcant Congressional debate arose concerning the failure to take into account the interests of generics relying
on the earlier seventeen year term. See generally Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, 141 Cong. Rec. S18183 (daily ed. Dec. 7,
1995); GATT and Prescription Drugs, 141 Cong. Rec. S15421 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1995).
7435 U.S.C. § 156(d)(1)(A).
75Id. at § 156(d)(1)(B).
76Id. at § 156(d)(1)(C-E).
77Id. at § 156(d)(1).
78Id. at § 156(d)(2)(A)(ii).
79Id. at § 156(e).
13account in market projections. If a generic competitor attempted to enter the market, they had the ability
to block it directly, asserting speciﬁc patent rights. What they lost in terms of potentially longer market
exclusivity, they gained in predictability and a more express delineation of their rights.
The results
The intended results of the amendments in the Hatch-Waxman Act can be seen in the following hypothetical
timelines, comparing the generic response to a brand name drug that, after its patent issued, underwent
four years of clinical trials and two years of FDA review. As can be seen in ﬁgure 1, prior to the passage
of the Act, the brand name drug would enjoy eleven years of exclusivity under its patent, and six years of
pseudo-exclusivity as its potential competitors were subjected to FDA review, allowing the public to beneﬁt
from drug price competition twenty-three years after the drug patent issued. In ﬁgure 2, after the passage of
the Act, the brand name drug would be entitled to a three year patent term extension. However, a generic
competitor submitting an ANDA would not lose any time to clinical trials, and would be able to enter the
market as soon as the term extension expires, allowing the public to beneﬁt from drug price competition
twenty years after the drug patent issued. This three year acceleration of generic market entry could save the
public billions of dollars. The eﬀect is even more dramatic if the generic drug manufacturer ﬁles a paragraph
IV certiﬁcation. Even assuming the duration of the infringement litigation is maximally prolonged, the
generic competitor could obtain FDA approval, and the six month period of exclusivity that motivated it
to challenge the patent, as soon as thirteen and a half years after the original patent issued, granting the
public almost an entire additional decade in which to enjoy lowered drug prices.
14The Hatch-Waxman Act has been successful in accomplishing its stated goals. In 2002 generics accounted
for 47% of prescription drug volume,80 more than doubling the 1983 level of 19%.81 And while only 36% of
the top-selling brand name drugs had generic competitors in 1983, by 1998 the competition level was almost
100%.82
80Federal Trade Commission, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An FTC Study i (July 2002)
[hereinafter FTC Report].
81CBO Study, supra note 7, at xii.
82Id. at 27.
15Chapter II: Paragraph IV certiﬁcations: A temptation to collude
Certain provisions in the Hatch-Waxman Act, particularly those that control exactly when the FDA’s ap-
proval of an application with a paragraph IV certiﬁcation is to take eﬀect, were written to strike a balance
between the competing interests of brand name and generic drug manufacturers, to prevent either side from
losing signiﬁcant ground in the compromise. Unfortunately, brand name drug companies have discovered
that they can be exploited in ways that allow them to maintain their market exclusivity indeﬁnitely. Par-
ticularly problematic provisions include the automatic thirty month stay of approval following ﬁling of an
infringement action,83 which was originally intended to reﬂect the period of time expected to be lost to
concurrent litigation and FDA review,84 but which can be abused by being repeatedly renewed through
listing of new patents to the Orange Book after the ﬁling of the ANDA, each of which would require a new
paragraph IV certiﬁcation and provide the opportunity to obtain a new thirty month stay,85 and the 180
day period of exclusivity for the ﬁrst successful ﬁler of a paragraph IV certiﬁcation, which, due to the fact
that the period of exclusivity can be “parked,”86 i.e. not triggered, indeﬁnitely, opens the door for situations
in which it is more proﬁtable to the generic to accept payments from the brand name company to stay oﬀ
the market than it is for the generic to enter the market, laying the groundwork for collusive agreements
that restrain competition and keep drug prices high. A recent FTC study on generic drugs challenging the
patents of brand name drug manufacturers showed some distressing recent developments.
8321 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) for an ANDA; 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(C) for a NDA.
84FTC Report, supra note 80, at 39.
85Id. at 40
86Id. at 58
16Exploiting the thirty month stay of approval
Normally, when an ANDA with a paragraph IV certiﬁcation is ﬁled, the brand name drug manufacturer
will, upon notice, initiate an infringement action based on an Orange Book listed patent, triggering a stay
of ANDA approval until the earlier of a judicial determination of non-infringement of the patent, or a thirty
month period, elapses. The thirty month stay of approval was consistent with the expected duration of
such litigation. Should another patent issue after the ﬁling of the ANDA, the ANDA applicant will have
to recertify it, and the new paragraph IV certiﬁcation can trigger a new thirty month stay. Prior to 1998,
most87 litigations between generic and brand name drug companies triggered only a single thirty month stay,
and the litigations themselves concerned infringement of only one or two patents.88 Many of the litigations
were resolved before the expiration of the thirty month period. However, two trends have arisen since 1998.
There has been a trend, in recent years, for the complexity of the patent infringement actions between
brand name and generic drug companies to increase, with signiﬁcantly more patents being asserted in an
average case.89 The major eﬀect of this shift is an increase in the average90 duration of litigation,91 normally
beyond a thirty month period, which means that, in determining the timing of ANDA approval, the thirty
month stay is becoming a more signiﬁcant determinant, being invoked more often, relative to an actual court
decision.
The other recent trend92 is the tendency of brand name drug companies to list additional issued patents in
87All but two. Id. at 39.
88For 8 out of 9 pre-1998 “blockbuster” drug litigations, only 1 or 2 patents were asserted. Id. at 47.
89For 3 out of 8 post-1998 “blockbuster” drug litigations, only 1 or 2 patents were asserted. 3 or more patents were asserted
in the remaining 5 actions, with some brand name drug companies asserting infringement of as many as 12 patents. Id. at
47-48.
9025 months, 13 days to a district court decision, 37 months, 20 days to a Federal Circuit decision. Id. at 47, Table 4-1.
91Of the 7 cases that have been pending for 30 months without a district court determination, 6 have involved 3 or more
patents. Id. at 48.
92Of the 8 such ﬁlings, 6 have occurred after 1998. Id. at 48, Table 4-2.
17the Orange Book after the generic’s ANDA ﬁling, forcing the ANDA applicants to recertify their application
with regard to the newly listed patent, potentially triggering a new thirty month stay. The most vigorous
users of this method have, to date, been GlaxoSmithKline, the makers of the antidepressant PaxilTM,93 who
listed ﬁve sequential patents on the drug substance, formulation and method of use, extending the stay on
approval of several competing generics’ ANDAs out to 65 months,94 and Abbott Laboratories, the makers
of the antihypertensive HytrinTM,95 who listed three separate patents on their drug substance, creating a
total of 70 months96 of suspension of Geneva Pharmaceutical’s ANDAs.97 In this manner, through limited
strategic control of patent issuance, a brand name drug company could prolong its monopoly indeﬁnitely,
asserting a sequence of patents, bringing out a new one just before the previous one is found invalid or
not infringed.98 Of the eight products for which patents were listed to the Orange Book after ﬁling of a
competing ANDA, four (Hytrin, Paxil, BuSpar and Tiazac)99 involved patents that the drug companies had
ﬁled more than a year after obtaining FDA approval for their products, making them facially invalid as being
in violation of the on-sale bar of 35 U.S.C. § 102. None of the cases involving patents listed after the ﬁling of
a generic ANDA, for which court determinations have been made, found the patents in question valid and
infringed,100 suggesting that the subsequent patent listings are frivolous to some degree, performed for the
express purpose of extending the suspension of ANDA approval, making the underlying litigation a sham
that “may have little to do with the underlying value of the patent(s) at issue, and amounts, in some cases,
to a stipulated preliminary injunction without judicial review.”101 A patent must be listed in the FDA’s
93Id. at. A-33.
94Id. at 49, Table 4-3.
95Id. at A-29
96Id. at 49, Table 4-3.
97Id. at A-29-30.
98This is often referred to as the “evergreening” of the Orange Book. 148 Cong. Rec. S6906 (daily ed. July 17, 2002)
(statements of Sen. Corzine).
99Id. at 50.
100Id. at iii-iv.
101Julia Rosenthal, Hatch-Waxman Use or Abuse? Collusive Settlements Between Brand-Name and Generic Drug Manufac-
turers, 17 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 317, 327 (2002).
18Orange Book if an action for its infringement is to trigger the thirty month stay.102 Patents listed to the
Orange Book must meet certain requirements, insofar as they have to claim the drug, or a method of using
the drug, in such a way that a claim of patent infringement could reasonably be asserted against a generic
competitor.103 However, there is currently no way to privately challenge an improper listing.104 The FDA
has declared that it does not have the resources to police listing, and can only manage the Orange Book in
a ministerial fashion.105
The FTC report’s recommendation, to challenge these abuses of the Hatch-Waxman litigation procedure, was
to amend the Act to permit only one thirty month stay to be triggered by any ANDA.106 This limitation
would not aﬀect the brand name drug company patentees’ potential for remedies in other infringement
actions, merely curb potential misuse of the oﬀending provision.
Exploiting the 180 day period of exclusivity
To give generic drug manufacturers a reason to ﬁle ANDAs with paragraph IV certiﬁcations to challenge
weak listed patents,107 and risk the expense of the inevitable infringement action, the drafters of the Hatch-
Waxman Act included a provision granting a 180 day period of exclusivity to the ﬁrst generic to successfully
ﬁle an ANDA, during which no other ANDA for the product can be approved.108 Unfortunately, the
triggering mechanism for this provision leaves it open to abuse. The 180 day period starts running upon
102FTC Report, supra note 80, at 53.
10321 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1).
104See Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 268 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
105This position has been upheld by the court in Watson Pharm., Inc. v. Henney, Civil Action No. 00-3516 (D.Md. 2001).
106FTC Report, supra note 80, at iii-iv.
107Mova v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
10821 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
19either the ﬁrst commercial marketing of the drug,109 or a court decision holding the patents invalid or not
infringed.110 What happens when an ANDA is approved, for instance when the thirty month suspension
of ANDA approval, in response to a paragraph IV infringement action, has expired, but there is no court
decision, because the generic and brand name drug companies settled, and there is no commercial marketing,
because the generic has chosen not to produce or sell the drug product? Technically, in this situation, the
commencement of the 180 day exclusivity period is suspended, but no competing generic product can enter
the market until it expires.
Why would a generic drug company want to delay triggering the exclusivity period, when it had worked so
hard to challenge the brand name drug company’s monopoly? The answer, of course, is proﬁt. Without
competition, a brand name pharmaceutical can have a very high proﬁt margin. Should a generic competitor
enter the market, drug prices go down, as do proﬁt margins. If the potential loss of proﬁt margin to the
brand name drug company exceeds the potential proﬁt margin of the generic drug, it is to the economic
beneﬁt of both parties for the brand name drug manufacturer to pay the generic to delay entry into the
market.111 Unfortunately, a collusive agreement of this nature, despite its economic attractiveness to the
parties involved, artiﬁcially inﬂates drug prices, at incredible cost to the public, and is illegal as a horizontal
market allocation under antitrust law.112
Collusive agreements to limit the entry of generics to market are a relatively recent development. This is not
due to a recent resurgence of unscrupulousness in the pharmaceutical industry, but because such collusive
arrangements are based on an enforceable 180 exclusivity period, which was largely unavailable to generics
109Id. at § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I).
110Id. at § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II).
111This disparity in proﬁt margins would also explain why generics normally wait until after a court determination of invalidity
or non-infringement before entering the market: “[the] potential liability for lost proﬁts on the brand-name drug usually will
vastly exceed [the generic’s] own potential proﬁts.” FTC Report, supra note 80, at viii.
112In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 682, 695 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
20between 1992 and 1998, due to the FDA’s unusual interpretation of the exclusivity provision, 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(5)(B)(iv), which required generics to meet a “successful defense” standard, mandating signiﬁcant
investment in litigation on the generic’s part, rather than simply the “ﬁrst to submit” requirement of the
statute. The FDA had imposed this standard speciﬁcally to address the fear of collusive agreements delaying
drug entry. However, this standard was overruled by the court as inconsistent with the plain meaning of the
statute in Mova v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1998), in which a generic drug manufacturer
who had been challenged by the brand name patentee, thus initiating the thirty month stay, sued the FDA
because it was about to grant the ANDA of a competing generic, who the patentee had not sued, while the
litigation was still progressing. The court required the FDA to interpret the provision literally, and delay
the approval of the second generic until the ﬁrst generic could invoke its exclusivity. From 1998 on, several
generic manufacturers have taken advantage of the 180 day exclusivity provision, and in many respects, it
seems to operate as its drafters intended. Since 1998, the exclusivity period has been triggered 31 times, 19
times in response to commercial marketing of a generic, and 12 times in response to a court determination
of non-infringement or invalidity,113 which, to some extent, allays fears that the period of exclusivity exists
for the express purpose of not being triggered. However, problems arise when patent infringement litigation
between generics and brand name drug companies is resolved by settlement. In an FTC analysis, 70% of
these settlements, at the time of execution, contained provisions that could defer the triggering of the period
of exclusivity, potentially delaying the entry of subsequent generics to the market.114
The FTC’s recommendation to address this issue is to propose legislation that mandates that copies of
certain agreements between generic and brand name drug manufacturers are ﬁled with the FTC, facilitat-
ing their monitoring activities. How would the FTC determine whether a particular agreement contained
113FTC Report, supra note 80, at 60, Table 5-1.
114Id. at 58.
21anticompetitive collusive provisions? Antitrust law may be inapplicable, because the settlement agreements
involve the assertion of patent rights, which authorize otherwise impermissible monopolies. Former FTC
Commissioner Mary Azcuenaga suggested a simple two-part test, under which, if a patent was properly
obtained, and its scope was not improperly expanded, an antitrust analysis would be inapposite.115 FTC
Commissioner Thomas Leary proﬀered a simpler test, one that looks for reverse payments, consideration
granted by the patentee to the accused infringer, which, since they run counter to an expected negotiated
license, render the agreement presumptively anticompetitive.116
The FTC also called for minor reforms to clarify the exact triggering terms of the 180 day exclusivity period,
specifying that “commercial marketing”117 should include any marketing by the generic of the product
speciﬁed in the ANDA, even of the brand name version,118 and that “court decision”119 should include any
decision120 by any court.121
Responding to the FTC’s recommendations, various legislative responses have been proposed.
115Julia Rosenthal, Hatch-Waxman Use or Abuse? Collusive Settlements Between Brand-Name and Generic Drug Manufac-
turers, 17 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 317, 332 (2002).
116Thomas Leary, Antitrust Issues in the Settlement of Pharmaceutical Patent Disputes, Part II, Speech
Before the American Bar Association’s Antitrust Healthcare Program (May 17, 2001), available at http://
www.ftc.gov/speeches/leary/learypharmaceuticalsettlement.htm.
11721 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I)
118FTC Report, supra note 80, at ix. This is a response to concerns raised by a generic applicant’s marketing of ProcardiaTM
under a supply agreement with the brand name company.
11921 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II)
120FTC Report, supra note 80, at x. This is in support of a recent decision by the court in Teva Pharmaceuticals, USA, Inc.
v. FDA, 182 F.3d 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1999), which held that even a dismissal of a declaratory judgment action for failure to state
a case or controversy should be suﬃcient the trigger the exclusivity.
121Id. at ix. Teva Pharmaceuticals, USA, Inc. v. FDA, 182 F.3d 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1999), and Granutec, Inc. v. Shalala, 139
F.3d 889 (4th Cir. 1998) held that the provision could be triggered by the determination of any district court, overruling an
FDA regulation that required a decision from a court for which no appeal, short of a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court,
could be taken.
22Proposed reforms: Drug Competition Act of 2002
Senator Leahy’s proposed Drug Competition Act of 2002122 is a direct response to the FTC’s request to be
notiﬁed of certain agreements. It would mandate ﬁling with the FTC and the Assistant Attorney General
any agreement regarding the manufacture, marketing or sale of either the brand name or the generic drug
that is the subject of the generic applicant’s ANDA, or regarding the 180 day period referred to in 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) within ten days of the execution of said agreement. A civil penalty for non-compliance, of
not more than $11,000/day,123 could be imposed in an action brought by the Department of Justice or the
FTC, but no private right of action would be available.
The Drug Competition Act does a good job of addressing some of the FTC’s concerns regarding the 180
day period of exclusivity, but it may be underpunitive, especially considering that the artiﬁcially inﬂated
drug prices sustained by these potentially collusive agreements could produce a proﬁt margin diﬀerential of
hundreds of thousands to millions of dollars a day. A beneﬁt of this proposal is its relatively limited scope.
Beyond imposing a reporting requirement, it doesn’t extensively modify the provisions of the Hatch-Waxman
Act, which means that the risk that the Drug Competition Act will imbalance the delicate equilibrium of
concessions established by the Hatch-Waxman Act is minimal at worst, and non-existent at best. It would
serve as an ideal complement to legislative amendments of the Act itself.
122148 Cong. Rec. S11339 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 2002).
123This seems like an arbitrary amount, probably the result of some unspeciﬁed compromise, especially since earlier versions
of this Act had a $20,000/day penalty.
23Proposed reforms: Greater Access to Aﬀordable Pharmaceuticals
Act of 2003
A more ambitious and expansive legislative proposal, and one which, through signiﬁcant amendment of
provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act, runs a much higher risk of upsetting the balance established in 1984,
is embodied in the Greater Access to Aﬀordable Pharmaceuticals Act of 2003 bill.124
The Greater Access Act addresses systemic abuses of the thirty month stay by imposing more stringent
Orange Book listing requirements, including a certiﬁcation on a claim by claim basis that each listed patent’s
claims meet the 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) requirements,125 and requiring all relevant patents to be listed. As
a penalty for non-compliance, in addition to the existing risk of disapproval of a pending application126
or withdrawal of approval for a product,127 the Greater Access Act would add forfeiture of all claims of
infringement against ANDA or NDA ﬁlers for unlisted patents. This would, unfortunately, create an incentive
for potentially frivolous listings, as brand name drug manufacturers would feel compelled to list all patents
they may eventually want to enforce. To counteract this eventuality, the Greater Access Act also creates a
private right of action, reserved to ANDA, or NDA for a previously approved drug, applicants, to challenge
an improper Orange Book listing, with correction of the listed patent information or delisting as the exclusive
remedies. In response to the more stringent Orange Book listing requirements, paragraph IV certiﬁcations
would also be subject to a heightened notice requirement.
The Greater Access Act would also limit invocation of the thirty month stay to patents that were listed
prior to the approval of the brand name drug’s application. Subsequently listed patents would be unable
1242003 S. 54 (2003).
125I.e. that they claim a drug, or method of using a drug, and that they could reasonably be asserted in an infringement
action against a generic who manufactures, uses or sells the drug.
12621 U.S.C. § 355(d)(6)
127Id. at § 355(e)(4)
24to take advantage of the provision.128 This seems unduly harsh, potentially penalizing brand name drug
companies for delays caused by the USPTO. A reasonable concession would be some period of opportunity
after approval to make subsequently issued patents eligible for the stay, such as additionally granting the
opportunity to invoke the stay to all patents ﬁled within the ﬁrst year after FDA approval, or all patents
issued in the automatic exclusivity periods deﬁned in 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(D) and (j)(5)(D).
Hatch-Waxman Act litigation would also be made the exclusive litigation procedure. Failure to assert
infringement within the forty-ﬁve days following notiﬁcation of the ﬁling of a paragraph IV ANDA would
preclude the subsequent ﬁling of such an action.
To address abuses of the 180 day exclusivity provision, the Greater Access Act would more clearly deﬁne
the triggering events, limiting the term “court decision” to a court from which no appeal short of a Supreme
Court writ of certiorari could be taken,129 but allowing a Federal-judge-signed settlement order or consent
decree that includes a ﬁnding of non-infringement or invalidity to trigger the period. The reforms do not
address settlements that do not include such a ﬁnding,130 nor do they address the FTC’s recommendation to
expand the deﬁnition of “commercial marketing” to include resale, by the generic, of brand name products.
The Greater Access Act would also create conditions under which the 180 day period could be forfeited,
allowing the beneﬁt of the exclusivity, and risk of forfeiture, to pass to the ﬁrst subsequent ANDA applicant.
Most notably, one of these forfeiture events is a failure to market the drug by a certain, but as yet unspeciﬁed,
deadline.131 The 180 day period may be less valuable to subsequent ANDA applicants, however, as the
128But they would still be listed, to avoid forfeiture of infringement claims.
129Overruling the holdings of Teva Pharmaceuticals, USA, Inc. v. FDA, 182 F.3d 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1999), and Granutec, Inc.
v. Shalala, 139 F.3d 889 (4th Cir. 1998), contrary to the FTC’s recommendations. FTC Report, supra note 80, at ix-x.
130It may be possible to correct this deﬁciency by expanding the provision to allow any settlement order or consent decree
that does not include a ﬁnding of infringement to trigger the 180 day period.
131The deadline, if or when Congress decides on one, should give the generic drug company some lead time in which to build up
its supplies, or else legislatively overrule Biogen v. Schering AG, 954 F. Supp. 391 (D.Mass. 1996), which held that stockpiling
in anticipation of ANDA approval does not fall within the 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) exemption.
25previous forfeiting generics will still, presumably, be able to market their products during the subsequent
applicant’s period. Pairing forfeiture of the exclusivity period with a temporary withdrawal of approval could
correct this discrepancy in the proposed Act.132 In the current bill, the period of exclusivity would only be
available to those ANDA applicants against whom an infringement action has been brought,133 limiting it
to its originally intended use as a reward for challenging patents.134
Possible rationale for brand name drug companies’ actions
Any attempts at reform must take into consideration the possibility that brand name drug companies may
have legitimate concerns, beyond the maximization of proﬁt and maintenance of their market exclusivity,
that can, at present, be addressed only by resorting to these illegitimate anticompetitive techniques. What
both methods have in common are that they allow brand name drug companies to circumvent an actual
judicial determination of the validity of their patents. Fear of such a determination might not necessarily
arise from any inherent weakness in, or distrust in the integrity of, their patents, but from a recent line
of cases in the Federal Circuit that dramatically altered the background against which a determination of
validity of a pharmaceutical or biotechnological patent was to be made, threatening the validity of older
patents, and justifying a resurgence in the issuance and listing of new patents which take this change into
account.
132Although one of the beneﬁts of the bill as it stands is that even if the brand name manufacturer is willing to orchestrate
collusive agreements, it will have to enter multiple such agreements, until it will eventually become more proﬁtable to just open
the market.
133Which could, ironically, give brand name drug companies holding weak patents some leverage, by threatening not to sue.
134Although this provision would eﬀectively overrule part of the holding of Mova v. Shalala.
26This line of cases developed gradually,135 but reached their peak in 1997136 with Regents of the University
of California v. Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997), in which a heightened written description require-
ment137 was imposed on a patent for recombinant plasmids, and microorganisms that have incorporated
the recombinant plasmids, that produce human insulin. This was the ﬁrst time that a separate, speciﬁc
written description requirement had been found (up until that point, the written description requirement
analysis had been conﬂated with the enablement requirement analysis) and used to invalidate a patent.138
The introduction of a new standard of adequacy for a patent speciﬁcation, although the Eli Lilly court
claimed that that standard had always been in eﬀect, could easily have threatened the validity of any patent
ﬁled before the formal acknowledgment of an independent written description requirement. This may be one
reason why 75% of patent litigations between brand name and generic drug manufacturers that are resolved
by court decisions come out in favor of the generic.139
135The expansion in doctrine was suggested in Amgen v. Chugai, 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed.Cir. 1991) and Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d
1164 (Fed.Cir. 1993).
136Which, coincidentally, correlates with the recent resurgence of post-ANDA Orange Book listings of new patents and recent
increases in the complexity of infringement actions, as described in FTC Report, supra note 80, at iii.
13735 U.S.C. § 112 ¶1: “The speciﬁcation shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner of making
and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with
which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same...”
138The Federal Circuit chose to curtail itself, limiting further expansion of the written description doctrine in 2002 with Enzo
Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 296 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
139FTC Report, supra note 80, at viii.
27Chapter III: The Bolar amendment: The death of research tools?
Generic drug companies have been able to circumvent the intended purposes of the Hatch-Waxman Act by
leveraging their exclusive rights under the Act in collusive arrangements with brand name drug companies,
to the detriment of the public, but they, have also been able to circumvent those intended purposes to the
detriment of the brand name drug companies, exploiting a provision of the Act, the 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)
“research safe harbor,” also known as the Bolar amendment, in a manner that threatens not only the
temporary market exclusivity of the brand name drug companies, but the structure of the pharmaceutical
research ﬁeld, and the viability of the currently emerging research tools industry, which could have serious
repercussions on the development of the next generation of drugs.
The Bolar amendment
The Hatch-Waxman Act amended § 271 of the Patent Code, adding section (e)(1), which provided that
it was not “an act of infringement to make, use, oﬀer to sell, or sell within the United States or import
into the United States a patented invention ...solely for uses reasonably related to the development and
submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use or sale of drugs or
veterinary biological products.” The terms in the statutory language diﬀer in certain respects from those in
other provisions of the Act, and the nuances inherent in those terms underscore the importance of responsible
28judicial interpretation in applying the provision in accordance with its underlying legislative intent. Several
words and phrases in the Bolar amendment raised several important questions that were left to the courts
to determine. This chapter will examine the eﬀorts of several courts to respond to these questions, whether
their responses can reasonably be aligned with the legislative intent underlying the Act, and the potential
consequences, both intentional and unintentional, of their determinations.
Questions of interpretation
The Bolar amendment doesn’t mention a particular party that is to beneﬁt from the infringement immunity,
although an analysis of the legislative intent behind the Act, and the partial symmetry between the Bolar
amendment and 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2),140 suggests that this provision was designed to protect generic drug
companies, i.e. entities that ﬁle or intend to ﬁle ANDAs, from premature actions for infringement. Should
the research exception defense be provided to defendants that are not in the process of preparing to ﬁle, nor
ever intend to ﬁle, an ANDA?
The amendment permitted research activities for submission of information under Federal laws that regulate
“drugs.” Is the word “drugs” to be narrowly construed to apply to pharmaceuticals, or can it also be applied
to biologics, or medical devices? If the word “drugs” is applied broadly, such as in the context of medical
devices, does it apply equally to products that are subject to abbreviated review periods or less stringent
standards?
140“The result is to bar a patent holder from suing for infringing use during the development and testing stage, but allow the
patentee to sue under an expedited process once the infringer ﬁles for approval of the drug. Thus, what Congress taketh away
in Section 271(e)(1), it gives in Section 271(e)(2).” Allergan v. Alcon Labs, 200 F. Supp. 2d 1219 (C.D.Cal. 2002).
29The Bolar amendment refers to acts “solely for uses” of FDA submissions, but what clause does the word
“solely” modify? Does the exclusive purpose of the potentially infringing acts have to be generation of
information required or potentially required by the FDA, or can the research be employed to other ends, in
addition to responding to FDA information requests?
For the Bolar amendment to apply, the potentially infringing act must be “for uses reasonably related” to
submission of information to the FDA. Who is more capable of determining whether an action is “reasonably
related,” the courts or the FDA, and who should the ﬁnal determination be left to? What qualiﬁes as a
“reasonably related” use, and how attenuated can the relationship between a potentially infringing act and
a submission of information to the FDA be before a use is deemed unreasonable?
One of the primary divergences from the statutory language of the rest of the Act is found in the Bolar
amendment’s reference to a “patented invention,” rather than to “a drug claimed in a patent or the use of
which is claimed in a patent,” as in 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2), which raises important concerns about the breadth
of the exemption, and the range of patents over which a researcher can be immunized from infringement. Did
Congress really intend this provision to allow a defense against infringement, and a concomitant curtailment
of the exclusivity rights, of a much larger group of patents than those that could be beneﬁted by the
accompanying term extension? The resolution of this issue is of particular importance to the burgeoning
research tools industry.
30Expansion of scope in the courts
The signposts for statutory interpretation of the Bolar amendment were set by the Supreme Court in 1990 in
the case of Eli Lilly v. Medtronic, 496 U.S. 661 (1990). In this case, Eli Lilly’s predecessor-in-interest held two
patents with claims that encompassed an implantable cardiac deﬁbrillator. Medtronic tested and marketed
its model of an implantable cardiac deﬁbrillator in anticipation of a submission of information under the
FDCA as a Class III medical device, a category of products with a regulatory review procedure similar
to that mandated for new drugs. Eli Lilly sued Medtronic for infringement, and the district court ruled
in Lilly’s favor, permanently enjoining Medtronic from further infringement, despite Medtronic’s asserted
defense that its activities were non-infringing under the Bolar amendment.141 The court of the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania held that the statutory language “regulates the manufacture, use or sale of drugs”
limited the applicability of the exception to drug products.
The district court’s holding was reversed by the Federal Circuit,142 who gave a broader interpretation to this
clause, allowing it to encompass medical devices as well. It turned to the legislative intent as justiﬁcation,
asserting that Congress had created 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) to overrule the Federal Circuit’s earlier decision
in Bolar, and that, although the patented invention in that case had been a drug product, the holding in
that case had not been expressly limited to drug products, and, as a consequence, the statutory provision
that overruled that holding should not be limited to drug products. The Federal Circuit remanded the
case back to the district court, who were to operate on the assumption that 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) did
apply to medical devices, for a determination of whether Medtronic’s activities were, in fact, “solely for uses
reasonably related” to the FDA application procedure, an issue raised primarily by Medtronic’s marketing
141Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 1033 (E.D.Pa. 1988).
142Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 872 F.2d 402 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
31activities.143
The Supreme Court aﬃrmed this judgment, with Justice Scalia’s opinion providing two possible justiﬁcations
for its holding, one narrow and one broad, and ultimately settling on the broader one. Eli Lilly had claimed
that the Bolar amendment should be limited to drug products to eﬀect a statutory symmetry with 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e)(2) and (4), which produce the “highly artiﬁcial act of infringement,”144 the statutory infringement
of a paragraph IV certiﬁcation ANDA, and which are limited to patents for drugs or drug methods of use.
The Supreme Court proﬀered a narrow justiﬁcation for its holding, countering Eli Lilly’s assertion with
the suggestion that § 271(e)(1) had not been eﬀected simply to limit the timing of an infringement action
in response to a paragraph IV certiﬁcation ANDA, but to correct the distortion in patent term, due to
the brand name drug companies’ loss of patent term to regulatory review and their gain of patent term
through obstruction of generic drug companies’ regulatory review, that the Hatch-Waxman Act had been
designed to remedy, leading to the implication that the proper source for establishing statutory symmetry
was the 35 U.S.C. § 156 patent term extension provision, which did encompass medical devices and other
products subject to a regulatory review period. However, the Court settled on the broader justiﬁcation that
the contested clause modiﬁed the term “Federal law” in the provision, which made it a reference to “an
entire statutory scheme of regulation,” to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (which did, in part, regulate
drugs) in its entirety, such that the Bolar amendment’s exception to infringement was not limited to those
products mentioned in the patent term extension provision, but was applicable to any patented invention,
any product, mentioned anywhere in the entirety of the Act. It is this interpretation that Justices Kennedy
and White criticized in their dissent, decrying it as an unprecedented divergence from the norms of statutory
143The District Court granted Eli Lilly an injunction to prevent Medtronic from all non-§ 271(e)(1)-exempted infringement,
which Eli Lilly used to curtail Medtronic’s marketing activities. On appeal from this order, the Federal Circuit found for
Medtronic, holding that their marketing activities were merely a threat of sale, which did not rise to the level of infringement.
Eli Lilly v. Medtronic, 915 F.2d 670 (1990).
144496 U.S. at 678.
32construction. Reliance on this broader justiﬁcation laid the groundwork for subsequent broad interpretation
of the Bolar provision by other courts. Has the breadth of interpretation gone too far? Have courts abdicated
their duty to reasonably construe this statute?
In the case of AbTox v. Exitron, 122 F.3d 1019 (Fed.Cir.1997), the Federal Circuit carried the Supreme
Court’s reasoning to the next logical level.145 AbTox and MDT, an aﬃliate of Exitron, both held patents on
plasma sterilization devices for medical instruments. AbTox was marketing a plasma sterilizer, and MDT
was experimenting with one to gather data necessary for ﬁling an application with the FDA for approval of
as a Class II medical device. MDT sued AbTox for infringement of its patent, which AbTox claimed was not
infringed because the claims did not read on to its product, and AbTox sued MDT for infringement of its
patent, which MDT claimed was not infringed because its activities were exempt under the Bolar amendment.
The court of the District of Massachusetts found non-infringement on both counts, and certiﬁed the case
to the Federal Circuit.146 The Federal Circuit aﬃrmed on both counts. In upholding MDT’s defense, it
held that the Bolar amendment applied to Class II medical devices, despite the fact that Class II medical
devices are subject to an abbreviated review, can actually be marketed without advance approval provided
they comply with federal performance regulations, and are ineligible for patent term extension. To support
this expanded defense, the Federal Circuit discussed the Supreme Court’s decision in Eli Lilly, both the
narrow holding derived from symmetry between 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) and § 156, which would not extend Bolar
amendment protection to Class II medical devices, and the broad holding derived from interpretation of “a
Federal law,” which would. The Federal Circuit ultimately had to follow the reasoning behind the broader
holding, even if, in this case, the result was in conﬂict with the Court’s narrower reasoning, claiming that the
145As it had threatened to do in Chartex International v. M.D. Personal Products Corp., 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 20560 (Fed.
Cir. 1993), which applied the Bolar exception to a Class II medical device, a female condom, but only because the patentee
had not raised the argument of its applicability.
146Abtox v. Exitron, 888 F. Supp. 6 (1995).
33Court “command[ed] that statutory symmetry [was] preferable but not required.”147 The Supreme Court’s
mandate that 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) be interpreted broadly had begun to bear fruit, results that conﬂicted
with its preferred interpretation, and threatened to frustrate the legislative intent behind the provision.
AbTox also objected to the rather attenuated link between MDT’s testing activities, which it outsourced
to Exitron in the hope that Exitron would purchase its patent, and FDA pre-market approval, which was
not even entirely necessary for Class II devices provided they complied with FDCA “special controls,” an
objection the Federal Circuit addressed through reference to Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc. v. Ventritex Inc.,
982 F.2d 1520 (Fed.Cir.1992). Ventritex had been conducting clinical trials of its implantable deﬁbrillator,
during which it had been selling the product, at cost, to investigators. It had also publicized its product to
investors and journalists, and displayed its product to physicians and non-physicians at medical conferences.
Telectronics sued for infringement of its deﬁbrillator patents, alleging that displaying the product to non-
physicians, and using data for commercial purposes unrelated to FDA approval, fell outside the scope of the
Bolar amendment exemption. Losing at trial, they appealed. The Federal Circuit aﬃrmed, holding that
Congress did not intend to “prevent[] competitors from using ...the derived test data for fund raising and
other business purposes,”148 laying out the groundwork for the contention in subsequent cases that the clause
“solely for uses reasonably related” requires only that the uses be reasonably related to FDA approval, but
need not have FDA approval as their exclusive purpose. In AbTox, MDT’s “intent or alternative uses are
irrelevant to its qualiﬁcation to invoke the section 271(e)(1) shield.”149
147122 F.3d at 1029.
148982 F.2d at 1524-25. Supporting its later, unpublished, non-precedential decision in Intermedics v. Ventritex, 991 F.2d
808, 1993, another implantable deﬁbrillator case, in which it asserted that “[t]here is no suggestion that a producer may only
rely on the exemption if it does not intend to commercialize the product before expiration of the patents,” aﬃrming the court of
the Northern District of California’s contention that the relevant inquiry was to determine if it “would [] have been reasonable,
objectively, for a party in defendant’s situation to believe that there was a decent prospect that the use in question would
contribute (relatively directly) to the generation of kinds of information that was likely to be relevant in the processes by which
the FDA would decide whether to approve the product.” Intermedics v. Ventritex, 775 F. Supp. 1269, 1280 (N.D.Cal. 1991).
149122 F.3d at 1030.
34In the preceding cases, it was not contested that the potentially infringing activities were, at least in part,
undertaken to prepare information for FDA ﬁling. What is the FDA’s role in the determination of whether or
not activities are reasonably related to a ﬁling? That question was recently addressed in Nexell Therapeutics
v. AmCell 199 F.Supp.2d 197 (D.Del. 2002). Nexell held patents on a method for purifying human stem
cells for therapeutic use, which it employed in its product, a magnetic cell separator. AmCell introduced
a competing product, which it distributed to clinicians below cost in order to compile data for submission
to the FDA as a Class III device application. The FDA had expressed concerns regarding deﬁciencies in
the design of AmCell’s study that unnecessarily prolonged the investigation. The court initially deferred
to the FDA,150 and the parties submitted questions to the FDA Deputy Chief Counsel concerning the
appropriateness of AmCell’s actions. The FDA predictably responded that it had made, and would continue
to make, determinations regarding the degree of AmCell’s compliance with FDA regulations, but that it was
not in a position to independently determine (probably because its resources were already stretched to their
limits, and such a determination would open the ﬂoodgates to requests by parties to other litigations) whether
particular activities fell within the Bolar amendment exception, noting that “the ultimate construction and
application of [patent law] lies with the court and that as such the court could determine to what extent, if
any, the actions and statements of the FDA are relevant indicators of which activities are reasonably related to
the approval process and which are not,”151 also noting that the FDA’s standards may be wholly unrelated to
the criteria the courts use to construe the provision. The court went on to determine that, despite the FDA’s
disapproval concerning certain of AmCell’s methods, AmCell had not received communications from the FDA
that clearly indicated that AmCell could not have reasonably believed its activities were related to obtaining
FDA approval. Absent a clear statement otherwise by the FDA, the established precedent mandates that
courts give considerable deference to defendants asserting a Bolar amendment defense, and “if the defendant
150See Nexell Therapeutics v. AmCell, 143 F.Supp.2d 407 (D.Del. 2001).
151199 F.Supp.2d at 202.
35reasonably believes that certain otherwise infringing activities would yield necessary information for FDA
approval, but the FDA subsequently disagrees, the FDA’s opinion does not convert those activities from
exempt under § 271(e)(1) to infringing activities.”152
In most of the cases where a Bolar amendment defense has been asserted, it has been at least partially suc-
cessful, thanks to the gradual case-by-case expansion of its scope.153 However, building on this precedent,
the exemption is about to grow too far, verging on an interpretation that might destroy the research tools
industry, an industry whose existence Congress was probably unaware of in 1984, when the Act was passed,
but whose existence Congress could not possibly object to today, as it underlies almost all modern phar-
maceutical research. The ﬁrst threatened step oﬀ the brink, into the abyss,154 is Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.
v. Rhˆ one-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19361 (SDNY 2001). Rhˆ one-Poulenc held patents
on preparing the cancer drug taxol, and intermediary compounds, taxane derivatives. Bristol-Meyers in-
cluded the taxane derivatives as part of a molecular library for use in its research and development program,
searching for taxol analogues. Rhˆ one-Poulenc sued for infringement. Despite the fact that Bristol-Myers’
research was in the early stages, that they were in the process of running “hundreds of experiments for
purposes of possibly identifying a drug candidate,”155 where it was uncertain that any functional compound
would be found, much less one that would warrant submission of an application to the FDA,156 the patents
152Id. at 204
153Of course, there is a small subset of cases in which attempts to push to push the Bolar amendment beyond reasonable
limits have been thwarted. See e.g. NeoRx Corp. v. Immunomedics, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 202 (D.N.J. 1994) (patent for
labeling proteins with radioactive metal isotopes was infringed by tests and shipments of samples where activities had been
clearly designated as being required for foreign, but not FDA approval); Biogen v. Schering AG, 954 F. Supp. 391 (D.Mass.
1996) (stockpiling beta-interferon in anticipation of FDA approval does not fall within § 271(e)(1) exception); PharmaStem
Therapeutics v. ViaCell, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3047 (D.Del. 2003) (for infringement suit regarding methods for collecting,
processing, and storing umbilical cord blood stem cells, defendant’s summary judgment motion was denied because § 271(e)(1)
applicability remained unresolved, as genuine issue of material fact existed concerning whether stem cells were considered drugs
under FDCA, and whether exception was applicable to party ﬁling an investigational new drug (IND) application).
154A major step toward the edge, however, was Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D.Mass.
1998), in which use of patented erythropoietin as a reference standard against a competing product-in-development was deemed
to fall within the exemption, despite the fact that the ultimate product of the eventual FDA submission would not infringe the
contested patent, primarily because use of a reference standard was FDA mandated procedure.
1552001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19361, at 4.
156And much pharmaceutical research operates serendipitously, with R&D programs churning out several failed compounds
36that were allegedly infringed were not ones that Bristol-Myers’ end product could ultimately infringe, and
Bristol-Myers was not a generic drug manufacturer, the court of the Southern District of New York held that
the Bolar amendment exempted Bristol-Myers’ activities. Rhˆ one-Poulenc unsuccessfully argued that the
term “patented invention” should be considered in the context of the Act as a whole, attempting to impose
a statutory symmetry that limited it to inventions subject to a 35 U.S.C. § 156 patent term extension, but
this ran contrary to the Eli Lilly and AbTox line of cases, and the court construed it to encompass any
and all inventions. Rhˆ one-Poulenc had a more legitimate argument with its contention that Bristol-Myers’
infringing activities were not “reasonably related to the development and submission of information” to
the FDA, that the connection between its present activities and an FDA ﬁling were incredibly attenuated.
Bristol-Myers might potentially have developed a new drug product, which might potentially have passed
initial screening and testing, which might eventually have led to the decision that an FDA application was
warranted. The court described the standard established in Intermedics, i.e. “would it have been reasonable,
objectively, for a party in defendant’s situation to believe that there was a decent prospect that the use in
question would contribute (relatively directly) to the generation of kinds of information that was likely to
be relevant in the process by which the FDA would decide whether to approve the product?”157 This is
already a very loose standard, but the Special Master that the Bristol-Myers court assigned to the case
opened it even further, stating that there was a “decent prospect” that Bristol-Myers would eventually meet
the Intermedics standard, and granting Bristol-Myers the exemption. Pursuant to the reasoning in this case,
the Bolar amendment exemption would apply even before a candidate for submission to the FDA has been
identiﬁed. Courts would now be able to entirely abrogate their duty to determine what uses are “reasonably
related,” and could grant a blanket exemption from infringement of any patent for any product used at any
time in the drug research and development process.
for each successful drug, although modern research tools are gradually changing the R&D landscape, allowing for more targeted
drug development.
157775 F. Supp. at 1280.
37A step back from the edge took place in Inﬁgen, Inc. v. Advanced Cell Tech. Inc., 65 F.Supp. 2d. 967
(W.D.Wisc. 1999), in which the defendant was actually denied a Bolar amendment defense. Inﬁgen held
patents on a process for activating oocytes for use in cloning, a process that Advanced Cell used in attempting
to develop transgenic cattle capable of supplying human serum albumin in their milk, a protein which would
require FDA approval to commercialize. Inﬁgen sued for infringement, and actually prevailed. The court
had dared to apply the Supreme Court’s narrower holding in Eli Lilly, that of the congressionally intended
symmetry between 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) and § 156. Because, ultimately, the patent that was infringed did
not cover a drug product or process as broadly deﬁned within the Hatch-Waxman Act, the Bolar amendment
was held not to apply.
Inﬁgen is in direct conﬂict with Bristol-Myers. The Inﬁgen court’s reasoning seems to be signiﬁcantly more
in line with the Congressional intent behind the Hatch-Waxman Act than Bristol-Myers’, but it is apparently
based on a line of Supreme Court reasoning that the Federal Circuit and other district courts have commented
on but disclaimed. Bristol-Myers, relative to Inﬁgen, is more consistent with relevant precedent, although
it pursues it to a dangerous conclusion. Should the Bristol-Myers holding stand, the research tools industry
could collapse. Their products are speciﬁcally designed for use in research and development programs. They
would no longer be able to collect royalties on their products, because any use of their products by researchers
would automatically be insulated from a claim of infringement by the Bolar amendment. The current status
of the Bristol-Myers holding is ambiguous. The Federal Circuit recently aﬃrmed the district court’s decision,
but on the entirely diﬀerent ground of inequitable conduct before the patent oﬃce, rendering the patents in
question unenforceable.158 However, the original holding was never explicitly overruled.
158Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhˆ one-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7103 (Fed.Cir. 2003).
38Threats to the research tools industry
This is where the Hatch-Waxman Act runs up against the complex research tools industry. Its growth is a
fairly recent phenomenon, and although it was not particularly inﬂuential in the Congressional considerations
leading up to the Act, it is a major player in the current pharmaceutical industry, and has signiﬁcantly
shifted the equilibrium position away from the delicate balance between brand name drug companies and
generics that the Act sought to establish. In the old paradigm, brand name drug companies developed new
drugs, and generics made those drugs aﬀordable to those who needed them. The research tools industry
has been appended to the other end of the equation. In the modern pharmaceutical ﬁeld, they provide the
techniques that lead to simultaneous development of vast numbers of next generation drug candidates, or
techniques that allow the targeted development of new and important subcategories of drugs, while the brand
name drug companies create these drug candidates and ﬁlter them through their research and development
programs to determine which ones are eﬀective and warrant IND ﬁlings with the FDA, with the generics
eventually bringing them to the people. Although the situational calculus has changed, the development of
the research tools industry is not necessarily intrinsically hostile to the growth of the generic industry. It
is only the current language of the Act, and its interpretation or misinterpretation by the courts, that has
indirectly pitted them against each other, forcing one to gradually concede power to the other in the legal
arena, although they rarely interact directly, preferring, instead, to use the brand name drug companies
as intermediaries, in the industrial arena. Ironically, the greater the encroachment on the research tools
industry of laws designed to protect generics and limit the powers of brand name drug companies, the more
powerful the brand name drug companies become. The research tools industry is assailed on all sides by
laws and legal doctrines that were probably never intended to apply to it.
39The problem of utility
The research tools industry holds patents on products that are characterized by their use in biotechnological
and pharmaceutical research, and by the fact that they usually are not ultimately incorporated into the end-
marketed drug products they are used to develop. Examples of these research tools include combinatorial
chemistry libraries, isolated targets and active sites, and high throughput biotechnological assays.159 They
can be distinguished from patents on expressed sequence tags (ESTs) and drug precursors, which claim a
product to be sold, often without signiﬁcant practical utility, or requiring intensive research to determine
their ultimate utility. Unfortunately, grouping research tools with ESTs often raises vehement objections
concerning their patentability, driven by a line of cases concerning the utility requirement for patented
inventions.
In Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966), the Supreme Court raised the bar for patentability of inventions,
for chemical and biotechnological inventions in particular, in a holding that may have had unintended
consequences for the present day research tools industry. A utility requirement for patentability is imposed
by 35 U.S.C. § 101, which requires that patented inventions be “useful.” In an interference proceeding in the
Patent Oﬃce, Manson asserted that he had discovered a process for making certain steroids, but the primacy
of his patent was denied because he had apparently disclosed no utility for his steroid products, although they
were homologous to functional steroids, which made them useful for research purposes. The Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals (predecessor to the Federal Circuit) reversed, applying the previous utility standard that
a process patent was useful if it created the product it described, and that “ ‘where a claimed process produces
a known product it is not necessary to show utility for the product’ as long as it is not detrimental to the
159Robert B. Blackburn, Chief Patent Counsel of Chiron Corporation, Remarks before the National Academy’s Board on
Science, Technology and Economic Policy’s Conference on Intellectual Property Rights (February 2, 2000).
40public interest.”160 The Supreme Court reversed the CCPA’s ruling, holding that mere non-detrimentality,
or homology to useful compounds, or the fact that the compound is being screened by scientists for possible
uses, is insuﬃcient to establish utility. The precedential value of the decision may be limited, because it
arose from an appeal of an action by the Patent Oﬃce, which imposes a signiﬁcant burden of proof on the
petitioner to overcome a prima facie rejection, and because, although it oﬀered examples of facts that were
insuﬃcient to establish utility, raising the bar of patentability, it gave no clear indication of where the bar
was raised to, what facts would be suﬃcient to satisfy the utility requirement. The Federal Circuit addressed
this issue in In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560 (Fed.Cir. 1995), holding that a patent applicant’s non-symmetrically
substituted anti-tumor compounds did not have to rise to the level of FDA approval to be considered useful,
and that “proof of an alleged pharmaceutical property for a compound by statistically signiﬁcant tests with
standard experimental animals is suﬃcient to establish utility.”161 This is still a heightened utility standard
relative to inventions in other industries, as reﬂected in the USPTO’s Revised Interim Utility Guidelines
Training Materials, which direct examiners of biotechnological inventions to determine if the applicant’s
invention meets the criteria of several gradations of utility, increasing in speciﬁcity from credible utility, to
speciﬁc utility, to substantial utility, to well-established utility. Research tools, which are not intended to
have applications beyond the research stage of product development, may have diﬃculty meeting any but the
broadest and most inclusive utility requirements, but they are distinguishable from ESTs, which the utility
guidelines were probably speciﬁcally drawn up to address, insofar as they serve their function, which is as
tools in drug development. No one asserts that they are end products with multiple potential unspeciﬁed
functions.
160383 U.S. at 519.
16151 F.3d at 1567.
41Reach-through royalties
Research tools are usually designed by university laboratories, or small independent ﬁrms. Since research
tools derive their proﬁtability from the drug products they are used to discover, in order to maximize both
overall economic (i.e. proﬁts) and societal (i.e. new eﬀective drug products/classes) beneﬁts, these ﬁrms
should maximize the probability that new drugs, generated using their tools, will be brought to market. The
underlying nature of the industry, therefore, encourages widespread licensing of tools to many competing
companies on the next rung of the drug development ladder, both the major brand name pharmaceutical
companies and the smaller biotechnology startups that hope to discover a breakthrough therapy that they
can leverage to become an attractive acquisition target for the major brand name pharmaceutical companies.
In order to derive a proﬁt from their inventions, research tool ﬁrms often employ a controversial licensing
scheme, that of reach-through royalties. The licenses are usually oﬀered for a relatively small initial payment,
as well as a small percentage of any proﬁts derived from the sale of drugs that are ultimately developed using
the tools.162 Curiously, the National Institutes of Health163 object to the reach-through royalties strategy,
ostensibly on a policy basis, as they see the minor increase to the royalty stack on the end-marketed drug
product as a disincentive for research and development programs seeking to acquire new research techniques,
as a barrier to the widespread dissemination of tools, but this policy appears to be based on a false economic
model, one in which disallowing reach-through royalties reduces the ultimate cost of the research tools. In
reality, however, elimination of this potential revenue source would simply drive the research tool developers
to compensate by increasing the initial lump sum payment requirement to obtain a license. This would raise
the bar for entry into the research ﬁeld outside the reach of small ﬁrms, eventually concentrating research
162Gerald J. Flattmann and Jonathan M. Kaplan, Licensing Research Tool Patents, 20 Nature Biotechnology 945 (Sept.
2002).
163Thomas J. Kowalski and Christian M. Smolizza, Reach-through licensing: A U.S. perspective, J. Commercial Biotech.
(July 14, 2000).
42tools in hands of major brand name pharmaceutical corporations, who would be the only ones who could
aﬀord to purchase the current generation of research tools, and to design the next generation. Because of
the failure of patent licensing as a system of extracting proﬁts from these technologies, the brand name
pharmaceutical companies would likely keep the next generation research tools as trade secrets, withholding
the potential beneﬁts derived from the public disclosure aspect of patenting, and slowing the overall rate of
innovation. Of course, this calamitous situation has not yet arisen. A licensing strategy employing reach-
through royalties is still potentially feasible for research tools developers. This strategy establishes a form of
economic parity, making the tools aﬀordable to major drug companies and small biotech ventures alike, and
maximizing the potential proﬁtability of the tool while linking that proﬁtability directly to the tool’s actual
usefulness in an economically eﬃcient manner. Unfortunately, this licensing scheme also runs up against the
doctrine of patent misuse, although there is relatively little precedent that is speciﬁcally relevant to the ﬁeld.
The problem of patent misuse
Patent misuse involves using a patent anticompetitively, to assert exclusivity and obtain concomitant con-
cessions, such as an agreement to pay royalties, in an area that the patent does not cover, either because
the activity lies outside the scope of the claims speciﬁed in the patent,164 or outside the group of activities
that are generally considered infringing, or the schedule of payments goes beyond the term of protection
of the patent.165 Because a reach-through royalty scheme could be seen as patent licensing conditioned on
payment of royalties based on sales of commercial products outside the scope of the patent or not enabled
164See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969); Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133
F.3d 860 (Fed.Cir. 1997).
165Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964).
43by the patent’s speciﬁcation, a potential infringer could assert patent misuse as a defense against a breach
of contract for failure to pay royalties. This problem was addressed peripherally by the Supreme Court
in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969), when they held that Hazeltine
had committed patent misuse by “conditioning the grant of a patent license upon payment of royalties on
products which do not use the teaching of the patent”166 (i.e. demanding a percentage of the total sales of
Zenith radios and televisions, even those products in which the Hazeltine invention was not incorporated).
This is, arguably, distinguishable from arguments that would arise in the research tools context, insofar as
the ultimate drug product, while not directly incorporating the patented invention, would not exist but for
the research tool. The Supreme Court did oﬀer a way out of the patent misuse dilemma for reach-through
licensors, as their primary objection was not to the payment of royalties on products outside the scope of
the patented invention, but to conditioning the grant of a patent license on such royalties. They did “not
purport to prevent the parties from serving their mutual convenience by basing royalties on the sale of all
[products], irrespective of the use of [patentee]’s inventions,” but to preclude “only situations where the
patentee directly or indirectly conditions his license upon the payment of royalties on unpatented products
– that is, where the patentee refuses to license on any other basis and leaves the licensee with the choice
between a license so providing and no license at all.”167 Therefore, a policy of reach-through licensing would
probably be feasible, so long as the research tools companies oﬀer licensees the option of a license on diﬀerent
terms, terms not contingent on payment of royalties on products outside the scope of the patent, and so
long as the potential licensee agrees to reach-through royalties as a matter of convenience, as an eﬀective
way of determining the value of the patent, and not as a matter of coercion. This reasoning has been used
successfully in recent cases. In Sibia Neurosciences v. Cadus Pharmaceutical, 225 F.3d 1349 (Fed.Cir. 2000),
a jury in the Southern District of California awarded a verdict of damages for infringement of a cell based
166395 U.S. at 135.
167395 U.S. at 135.
44screening method, using a damages calculation that clearly included royalties from products the infringer
discovered using the research tool at issue (the judgment was reversed by the Federal Circuit, but on grounds
of patent invalidity). In Bayer AG v. Housey Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 228 F. Supp. 2d. 467 (D.Del. 2002),
the court of the District of Delaware ﬁnally took the last step and actually upheld a reach-through licensing
arrangement for a research tool. Housey held patents on a method of screening for protein inhibitors and
activators, which, though covering no drug products directly, did have signiﬁcant use in determining the
potential of screened compounds to be developed as pharmaceuticals. Housey oﬀered two possible licensing
arrangements, one involving reach-through royalties (which had been agreed to by two licensees: Eli Lilly and
SCIOS, Inc.), and one requiring a lump sum payment determined as a percentage of the licensee’s research
and development budget, taking into account anticipated use of the research tool (which had been agreed
to by one licensee, Takeda Chemical Industries, Ltd.). Considering the inﬂuence of Housey’s clients in the
pharmaceutical industry, it was unlikely that Housey had exerted undue inﬂuence over them. The court
found no evidence that Housey had impermissibly conditioned the license grant on the reach-through royalty
provisions, determining that they were agreed to at the convenience of the bargaining parties, as the most
eﬃcient means of valuation of the patent license. Should the Bayer decision stand, it will provide a valuable
bulwark in the storm of conﬂicting legal doctrines that surround the ﬂedgling research tools industry.
Possible reforms
The current structure of the research tools industry, which relies on the legitimacy of its patents, of its
assertions of infringement, and of its reach-through royalties, is assailed on all sides, by the Bolar amendment,
by the doctrine of patent misuse, and by the old precedents and USPTO guidelines that create a heightened
4535 U.S.C. § 101 utility requirement. Probably the most direct way to reinforce this structure is to include, in
the overall scheme of Hatch-Waxman Act reforms, language that would limit the Bolar amendment in such
a way as to reinforce the narrower holding of the Court in Eli Lilly. The other major threat to the research
tools industry, the Court’s decision in Brenner, is diﬃcult to overrule legislatively, although its limited value
as precedent, and the fact that it did not actually create an aﬃrmative standard, make it more feasible to
circumvent it through internal USPTO regulations that would relax the utility requirement.
46Conclusion
In 1984 the Hatch-Waxman Act revolutionized the pharmaceutical industry, striking a balance between the
interests of brand name and generic drug companies, fostering innovation while giving the public access
to cheaper drugs, sooner. The current prescription drug market share held by the generic drug companies
suggests that the Act was, in large part, successful at meeting these goals.
However, the playing ﬁeld of the pharmaceutical industry has changed dramatically in recent years. Brand
name drug companies have learned to exploit loopholes in the Act, prolonging their monopolies. The research
tools industry, a signiﬁcant new player on the ﬁeld, has entered at a disadvantage, its rights artiﬁcially pitted
against those of the generic drug industry by laws that never anticipated its arrival.
Current legislative reform eﬀorts, prompted by FTC recommendations, are, to a considerable extent, ad-
dressing the former problem, and ignoring the latter. To successfully address these issues, to restabilize a
system that is gradually descending into chaos, attempts to mend provisions of the Act have to take into ac-
count the fact that the economic and innovative calculus applied to the pharmaceutical industry has shifted,
from the zero-sum game between the generic and brand name drug industries of the Hatch-Waxman era,
to a new state of shifting equilibria between the synergistically operating research tools, brand name, and
generic drug industries that can potentially be successfully harnessed for the beneﬁt of all.
47